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This paperusesa simple theoreticalmodelto show how
the credibility of unsterilized intervention policy may
affect the pattern of adjustment in the exchange rate,
velocity, and asset prices. When the outcome ofunsteri-
lized intervention is credible, anydegree ofexchange rate
stability can be achievedatthe costofa sufficiently large,
one·time changeinthe moneysupply. When the outcomeof
intervention is not credible, intervention can lead to per-
sistent, and possibly accelerating, changes in exchange
rates, the money supply, velocity, andassetprices. Under
certain conditions, intervention may even amplify the
cumulative'change in the exchange rate, rather than re-
duce it. The modelisusedto interpretTaiwan's experience
with unsterilizedexchange rate intervention in the second
halfofthe 1980s.
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Over the pastdecade, internation~lcapital mobility in
many Pacific Basin econol1lies has increasedconsiderabl~
ThisJrendhasmadeit more difficultforpolicymakers to
stabilize the foreign valueoftheir currencies. The greater
ability ofspeculators tobuy and selldOlnesticcurrencyin
foreign exchange markets has in some cases resulted in
unwelcome fluctuations in currency values, in spite of
governmeritefforts to limit such fluctuations.
Some progress has been made inunderstandingt?e
problems of stabilizing"the exch'l11ge ,rate jneco~?mies
witllll10bile international capitaL Re~.~ar~h inope~ econ-
omy macroeco~omicssince the 1960s de.~cri?~sho\V, dis-
turbances to foreign exchange ,.markets, and government
policies affectexchangeratebehaviorgivencertaininstitu-
tionalfeatures ofthe economy, suchas the degreeofcapital
mobility.or asset• substitutabilit~
More, recentl)', research has c1arifiedhowcredibility
affects the abilityofthegovernmen~ to enforceane~change
rate target. For example, Krugman(1979) shows howgov-
ernment attempts to peg the exchange rate with limited
foreign exchange reserves may lead to speculative attack
and an abandonment of the peg. Another literature (see
Lessard and Williamson 1987) analyzes capital flight in
economies that are forced to deal with serious macroeco-
nomic imbalances or that are saddled with large external
debt burdens. Such capital flight may impair the govern-
ment's ability to stabilize the exchange rate. However,
these approaches do not necessarily highlight the diffi-
culties that may arise when a well-managed economy (one
that faces no foreign exchange reserve constraints, main-
tains a largely balanced government budget, and has no
external debt burden) attempts to stabilize its currency.
This paper draws on the experience of Taiwan in the
1980s to shed some light on these potential difficulties.
Due to certain asymmetries in foreign exchange controls,
Taiwan had'a relatively high degree ofcapital mobility up
to 1987, while it maintained a policy oflil1liting move-
ments in the exchange rate. Taiwan's relative openness
exposed it to disturbances to its foreign exchange markets
inthe secondhalfofthe 1980s that illustratethe difficulties
that may arise when a country attempts to stabilize its
exchange rate.
Economic Review,/,1992, Number1Two features ofTaiwan's experience in the 1980sare of
particular interest..First, following a period oftranquility
i.nforeign exchange markets in the first half of 1980s, the
New Taiwan (NT) dollarappreciatedat an acceleratin~ rate
against the U.S. dollar from late 1985 through 1987, in
spite of increasing intervention in·exchange markets de-
signed tolimit such appreciation} Second, in spite ofthe
steep accelerationin money growth associated with inter-
vention after1985,there was relativelylittleinflationinthe
goods market. Rapidmoneygrowthwas associated in§tead
with a persistent decline intheincome velocity ofmoney
andaboom in asset prices. Neither the persistent accelera-
tion. in exchange rate •appreciation, .·nor .the relationship
between money growth and domestic goods and asset
pnceshav~been fully explailled.
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This paper suggests that the .persistent and accelerating
appreciation of the NT dollar may haVe been related to
government efforts to limit such appr~ciation. Some.sim-
pIe examples are offeredtoillustrate how such a situation
may arise if the government's exchange rate. policyloses
credibility. Using a conventional small open economy
model, it is also shown that intervention in response to
disturbances in Taiwan's foreign exchange markets may
have contributed to persistent declines in the income
velocityofmoney and to the boomin Taiw~'s assetprices.
It is .suggested that weak international arbitrage links,
which are at least partiy attributable to Taiwan's relatively
undeveloped domestic financial markets, facilitated the
sharp changesin asset prices. While the paper uses con-
v~nti()nal analyticaltools, it offers a new way ofthinking
aboutthe interaction between exchange market interven-
tion and exchangerate expectations and aboutthe potential
effects of such interaction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I provides
some backgroundon Taiwan's exchange rate policy, capital
mobility, and the domestic financial sector. Section II
describes a simple theoretical model ..that can be used to
examine the likely effects ofTaiwan's exchange rate policy
on the persistence ofshocks to exchange rate expectations
and the behavior of money, velocity, and asset prices.
Section III interprets Taiwan's experience using the frame-
workdeveloped earlier. Section IV sums up some·of the
lessons ofTaiwan's experience.
/. EXCHANGE RATE POLICY, CAPITAL CONTROLS
AND THE DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SECTOR3
To set the context for the theoretical analysis that fol-
lows, we review the characteristics ofTaiwan's exchange
ratepolicy, capital cOl}trols, and financial markets. Table!
summarizes the evolutionofTaiwan's external and domes-
tic financial sector policies in the 1980s.
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Exchange Rate Policy
The government's exchange rate policy in the.198Qs
reflectedtwo basic criteria. BeginninginSeptember1982,.
dailyfluc.tUations inthe currency were limited by a policy
rule requiring that the daily.adjustment (upward or down-
ward) ofthe spotrate notexceed2.25percentofthe central
rate on the previous business day. This rule was in effect
ulltilApril 1<)89, when the cUrrency.was tIoat~d.Policy­
makers also sought to prevent cUrrency movements from
excessively ..impairing the competitiveness of Taiwan's
export sector by limiting the rate. of appreciation of the
currency.
Controls onCapital Outflows, Notlnfl()ws
The implementation ofexchange rate policy.alsowas
influenced by the nature ofcapitalcontrols. Until 1987
capital controlsin Taiwan focused on preventing capital
outflows. For example, the government required that all
foreign exchange be sold to the central·batik in exchange
for local currency. (Authorizedforeigncurrencydepositsin
local batiks were exempt.) In contrast.to the stringent
controls on outflows, Taiwan his~orically had no effective
controls on capital inflows. In particular, foreign asset
holders could easily acquire NT dollar assets through the
banking segtor.
The aSYnllnetry in Taiwan's capitalcontrols was.reduced
in 1987 when the governmentsignificantly tightened re-
strictions on capital·inflows.while liberalizing capitalout-
flmvs. (These measures were in.response to a surge in
short-term capital inflows discussed later;) In May 1987,
the government froze the outstanding amount ofcommer-
cialbanks' foreign liabilities at US$13.8 billion (the level
ofMay 31,1987) and inJuly 1987restricte4inwardremit-
tances for eachperson to US$501000 peryear. ~strictions
on capitalinflows were.liberalizedin 1989 when the limit
on individualremittances was raised to US$200,OOO in
July,·toU~$500,OOOin September,and to US$lmillion in
November 1989.
At ~boutthe same time asrestrictions on capital inflows
were being imposed, restriction~ on capital ()utflows were
liberalized. Current accounttransactions were completely
liberalized on July 15,1987, and individualsorcompanies
were allowed to purchase and remit outward up to an
annual limit ofUS$5 million.
Thin and Underdeveloped Markets
'i'
As is the case in many developillgeconomies, Taiwan's














N~wTaiwan (NT) dollar pegged to the U.S; dollar.
All foreign exchange transactions requiregovernmentapproval. Currentaccount transactions and capital outflows
restricted. Exporters required to surrender their foreigncurrency eamings to the government.
Moderate restrictions on foreign bOrrowingby financial institutions, and on certain capital inflows.
Government determines interest rates set by banks.and in money and capital markets.
1979
February
The foreign ex:change.rnarket is established and a managed float is adopted.
The spotcentralrateofthe U.S.dollaragainstthe NTdollarhenceforthtobesetdailyby5majorauthorizedbanks
on the basis of the weighted average ofinterbank transaction rates on the previous business day.
The buying and selling rates for the U.S. dollar between the bank and the customer are set within the limit of
NT$O.05 above or below the central rate for transactions up to US$30,OOO. For larger transactions, the corre-
spoIlding limit is NT$O.lO.
1980
January
Privately held foreign currency deposits in authorized banks. permitted.
March
Daily exchange rate ceiling abandoned by Central Bank.
November
Banks allowed to set their own interest rates on NCDs and debentures, as well as on bill discounts.
A committee ofthe Bankers' Association is authorized to set, on a monthly basis, actualdeposit and loan rates
within ceilings determinedbythe Central Bank. The CentralBanksets maximum depositrates and maximumand
minimum loan rates.
Interestrates on·commercial paper, bankers' acceptances and Treasury bills·are fully liberalized.
1982
September
Central rate trading system established in the foreign exchange market with the exchange rate to be based on the
daily weighted average exchange rate of interbank trading.
1983
December
Offshore Banking Statutes established allowing local banks to engage in offshore banking.business.
1984
August
Bank restrictions on the holding oflong positions in foreign currencies removed.
November
Range of maximum and minimum loan rates widened by the Central Bank. The base loan rate lowered
Y2 percentage point.
(continued)









BanJ(s allowed to set prime rate.according to market conditions.
August
Banks allowed to set own rates on foreign currency deposits.
Banker's associationtosetthe range ofmaximumandtninimUIn lendingrates while the individual banks allowed
to charge customer rates based on creditrating and loan maturity date.
1986
October
Allowedforeigri banks to set up second branches in Taiwan.
March ..... ..... .. ..... ... .. ... . .... . ..
Limitation on the holding position and underwritingofshort-term bills issued by any single firm removed.
. Upp~r lill1it~nc~rnll1e~cialp~perllnderwriting·· forthebr~~ches~f· fo;eig~ banks raised.
1987
May
The Central~ankfreezes the outstanding amountofcommercial.banks' foreignliabilitiesatUS$ 13.8billion, the
level ofMay 31, 1987.
June
Foreign banks permitted to join the local inter-bank remittance system and the interbank ATMsharing.system.
July
Currentaccount transactions are completely liberalized on July 15. Requiremynts to surrender exportproceeds,
advanced import deposits and restrictions on payments for invisiblesare lifted.
An individual or a company is allowed to purchase and remit outward up. to an annual·limitofUS$5 million.
Aceiiing on inward remittances for each person set at US$50,OOO per year.
October
The Central Banklifts.the freeze onbaIlks'.foreign liabilities onOctober 1, 1987. Following capitalinflowof$3
billion, the Central Bank reimposes a freeze at $16.2 billion on October 2.
Borrowing of·foreign exchange by nonbanks is not subjectto the freeze.
1989
April. ... . .
A new systemofforeignexchange trading isestablished,based onbid-ask quotations. The new systemappliesto
interbank trading and retail trading over US$lO,OOO. The previous limits on daily fluctuations ofthe interbank
rate are rescinded.
July
The ceiling for banks' foreign liability is raised to 30% of the average daily balance during the 45-dayperiod
ended July 15, 1989.
The ceiling for inward remittances for each person is raised to US$200,000 on July 20.
i}.ugust
Foreign exchange interbank call loan market established.
September
Annual capital inflow increased from US$200,OOO to US$500,000perperson.
November
Capital inflow limitation increased to US$1 millionper individual.
July
All •remaining·regulations controlling maximum deposit rates and ••maximum and·minimum loan rates are
eliminated.
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 17Although interest rate restrictions were gradually liber-
alized in the 1980s and a 1989bankihg law significantly
liberalized entry by allowing foreign banks to offer a full
range'of banking serVices, restrictions on the financial
sectorhad an importanteffecton financial marketbehavior
for intichofthe decade. Financial policies have tradi-
tionallyguaranteedadominantrolefor government-owned
domesticbanks. These policies includedentry restrictions
(particularly" branching and operational restrictions'that
have limited the activities of foreign banks) and restric-
tions on deposit and loan interest rates that tendedto limit
competitive pressures.4
Financial sectorrestrictions tendedto segment financial
m.atketsluid reduced the allocation of funds outside the
regulated financial sector. Flow offunds.data reported by
the Central Bank.of China (1989) indicate that upto the
lllid-1980s, more than 50 percent ofthe financial uses of
fllndsofhouseholds and non-profit institutions were chan-
neledt6regulatedfinanCial marketintermediaries, notably
banks. .
Outside ofregulated financial intermediaries, the bulk
of household funds was channeled to two sectors. First,
households placed funds in the unregulated"curb" mar-
ket. On average, this sector accounted for less than 8
percent ofhousehold uses offunds, and its share tended to
declineinthe1980s. Second, households investedbetween
}Is and Y3 oftheirfunds in capitalmarkets. Tnebulkofsuch
investment was in the dit:ect acquisition ofshares in enter-
prises orin the stock market.
Stock market shares were the only tradable securities
readily available to household investors. By all accounts,
this market was quite thin, and arelatively limited amount
ofcapital was raised in this market. In the period 1980-85,
companies listed in the stock market accounted for only
about 16 percentofthe total capital ofTaiwanenterprises,
s6thathouseholds may have allocated as little as 3percent
(the20percenttotal·flow allocated to capital markets times
the 16 percent share of listed firms in the capital of
registeredenterprises) oftheirfunds to the stock market in
the 1980s.
The allocation ofhousehold funds to long-term bonds,
or to'money markets was negligible. The holding oflong-
term bonds (mainly central bank securities) and money
market, instruments (negotiable certificates of deposit,
bankers acceptances, and commercial paper) was domi-
nated by financial intermediaries.
To sumup, three features characterize the maCJ:'oeco-
np!Aicahd financial environment in the 1980s. First,
exchange rate policy was influenced by the desire of
poiicymakersto preserve the competitivenessoftheexport
seCtor and by a policy rule that limited fluctuations in the
18
exchange rate. Second, until 1987, capital controls curbed
capital outflows but did not effectively restrict capital
inflows.~ubsequent1y, capital outflows were liberalized,
while, inflowswererestrlcted. Third,Taiwan's secondary
financialmarkets were thin and underdeveloped.
fl. A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY MODEL
To assess theimplications ofthe institutional character-
istics ofTaiwan's economy, considerastatic, small open
economymodelwith flexible prices. Therearethreeassets:
40mestic money (m), a domestic financial asset earning
nonzero returns (h) which will be called a bond, and a
foreign,asset if) denominatedinforeign currency.
FOfconvel1ience, the return on the foreign asset is fixed
at zero. Real money demand is theil a function of the
nominalreturn onthe domestic asset (i), the expected rate
of appreciation of the domestic currency (x), real wealth
(w), andrealincome (y). Inwhatfollows variables inlower
case, exceptfor i and.x, are in logs. To simplify the discus-
sion, which is mainly concerned with the effects ofshocks
to exchange rate expectations, we assume inflationary
expectations are exogenous and set them to zero.
In.equilibrium real money supply equals real money
demand:
wherep is the domestic price and mj<O; mx,my, mw>O.
In equation (1), i reflects the opportunity cost of holding
money ratherthanthe domesticbond, whilex isthecostof
holding the foreign asset.
The equilibrium in the market for the foreign asset may
beexpressed as follows:
where St denotes the nominal exchange rate (foreign cur-
rency/NT$). Itis assumed thath, fx<O,/x' fw>O. Since
real money and foreign asset and domestic bond holdings
comprise total wealth, equilibrium in the domestic bond
(h) market follows from the wealth constraint and equa-
tions (1) and (2).
The.economy produces a single internationally traded
good. Domestic demand (at) depends on wealth, whilenet
exports (l?t) are determined by wealth and the re,al ex-
change rate rt = St+Pt- p/, wherep/ denotes th€t (exog-
enous) foreign price. Equilibrium In the goodS. market
re9uires,that the sum ofdomestic and net export demand
equal an exogenously determined national income:5
Ecoilomic Review / 1992, Number1where aw,bw>O; br<O. In th~model, s,p,andrare en-
dogenousand can be solved using equations(I), (2); and
(3).As showninAppendix A, the model yieldsthefollow-




s"YO,sm< 0, sf> 0
where A is the first difference operator,so ASt= St-S, ~t.
We focus on~.e effects of disturbances to exchange rate
exwctations,themoney supply, andforeign assetsbecause
they are particularly.relevant for Taiwan's case over the
time period b¢ing discussed.
Underplau~ibleassumptions,.an expected.appreciation
(a ris~inx)increases the demand for domestic assets,
resultingincutrency appreciation,alowerprice level, and
a.declineintbe domestic interest rate. An increasein the
money supply createsanexcesssupply ofmoney, resulting
ill. the depreciationofthedomestic currency, anincr~ase in
thedomestic·pricelevel,andalowerdomesticinterestrate.
An increase in the supply of the foreign asset creates an
excess demandfor domestic assets, resulting in currency
appreciation, a lower price leveLand. a decline in the
domestic interest rate. (qualitatively the same as. an ex-
pectedappreciation). These effects conform to whatmight
beexpected fromintuition.
ImplicationsofInstitutionalCharacteristics
Tlie institutional characteristics of Taiwan's economy
describedinSectionI affect tbe.specificationofthe model
orthe model's parametersina numberofways. In Taiw~,
th~ absen~eof••restrictions on capital inflows .•• allowed
speclliators·to arbitra~e between.domestic andforeign as-
sets (it is assumedthat.speculators who use. foreign assets
to acquire·domestic assets can reverse such transactions
with .•relative. ease,..as. seems· to h~lVe been the. case in
Taiwan). This·isreflected in tbe assumptionthat exchange
Federal Reserve Bank ofBan Francisco
rate expecta,tions affect the d~mand for domestic assets. If
capital controls were effective, speculators would be un-
a~le tp exchange theirforeignassetsfor domestic assets il,l
r~sponse to.changesinexChange rateexpectations~andthe
terms$x, Px' lx in equations (4) to (6) would equal zero.
.In small open economy models that assume perfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign.assets, the
domestic interest rate is determined by the interest parity
condition i. =. x. However, the thin and relatively less
developedfinancialmarkets ofTaiwansuggestthatdomes-
tic andforeignassets.are imperfectsubstitutes. As aresult,.
the domestic interestrate i, andexchange rate.exwctations
x enter s~paratelyinthemodel rather than being direc.tly
lirikedbyan.arbitrage condition.7 Thin andundeveloped
finan(:ialmarkets.alsoreducetheintereslseqsitivity.ofthe
demand for money and foreign assets'(mi andft).•·InsWC-
tion ofAppendix A'shows that this increases.therespollse
ofinterestrates (or assetprices) to shocks to exchange rate
expectationsortochangesinthesupplyofdomestic money
or foreign assets (ix' im,. ~ increase in equation (6».
Relatively weak arbitrage liriks may partly explainwhy
(:ertain ass~t.prices in Taiwan-notably the stockprice-
changed much more sharply than did comparable asset
prices in the U.S. arid Japan in the laterpart ofthe 1980s.
Implications ofExchange Rate Policy
Adjustment when the intervention outcomeiscredible.To
highlight'the consequences of central barik intervention
m<:>re fully, ·it.is useful to recall that the central barik can
change the money supplyin two ways. First, it.can inter-
vene in the foreign exchange market, which will. be re-
flected il,l changes. in the. net foreign assets held by the
central barik,labeled.f,"b; Second, it can undertake open
rnarketpurchases or sales of domestic bonds that change
tbe supply ofdomesticcredit, dt..These implications ofthe
central.bank balance sheet are approximatedby:
where W, 1-W arerespectively the average weights ofnet




so Adt=O. This is known as "unsterilized" intervention.
Suppose a shockraises the expectedrate ofappreciation
inthecurrencyfrom0 inperiod 0 to Xl inperiod I. The net
change inthe exchange rate inresponse to this shock is the
sumofthe changes inthe. exchange rate attributabletothe
private sector and the government,
19(8) (13 ' ), 1\ Feb _ -asxAx1
W~Jl-.
Snja
wl1erethentlmer~l subscriptsrefer tothe titne IJe~()d. ,The
change in the exchange rate attributable to the private
sectorfollows from equation (4): '
Thechange in the exchange rateattributable to the govern-
ment depends on the government's exchange rate policy.
Suppose that. the governmenthas apolicy ofreducing,the
rate ofchange iothe.exchange,rate,that wouldotherwise
resllitfrom private sector actions bya proportion O~a<l.
This policy,can he described bythe"following equation:
(1 ,0)' ~S g = -a&P= -as Ax 1 1 xl'
Thefirsfequality in equation (10) is thegoverntnent's
exchange rate rule. The,second equality follows from
equation (9). Eqtlations (8), (9), and (10) thenimplythat
the, one~period changeinthe exchangeraJeinresponsetoa
shock to exchange rate expectati()ns is:
The"central bank can.implementthe exchangeraterule
(lO)by increasing thetnoney supplyin order to purchase
foreign "bonds in the foreign exchange' market.-In the
absence of offsetting domestic open market operations,
thiswill be reflected in an increaseinthemoneysupplyand
a>tnatchingreductioninthe supplyofforeign assets heldby
domesticresidents (~mf= '--~fn. Equations (4) and(9)
imply that in order'to meet the central bank's foreign
exchange target, the money supply must adjust to a shock
to exchange rate expectations according to the following:9
(12)
where we define the coefficient Snja=sm ~sl<:O. In the
absence of domestic open market operations, the central
bank balance sheet relationship (7) implies that ~mf=
W~!Icb. (The readermay recallthatw, the average share of
foreign assets held by the central bank, appears in this
expressionbecausewe areusingalogapproximationtothe
central'bank balance sheet.) Using this last equality to
substitute for ~mf in equation(12), we find theincrease in
theforeignassetsheldbythe central bankthatis consistent
with the exchange rate target,given an initial shock to
exchange rate expectations:
20
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'Wecan)use the. preceding'framework to.assess the
itnplicationsof policy and behavioral parameters. Equa-
tion{ll)implies thatthe government can limit exchange
rate changes to any degree desired by increasing the
intervention parameter ex. However, greater exchange rate
stability will be associated with a larger change in the
money. supply 'and in the net foreign 'assets held by the
central bank (equations (12), and (13». This is a familiar
tradeoff.
Equations (12) and (13)al§0 indicate that the volume of
. interventionrequired to satisfytheexchange rate objective
(10) is afunction of institutional and behavioral param-
eters. 'The required,intervention is larger, the larger the
impact of expectations on the exchange rate sX' As dis-
cllssedin Section I, ifcapitalwere not mobile, Sx= 0 and
no intervention would berequiredforthe government to
achieve itsexchange rate target. Tlie required intervention
is smaller, the largerthe impactofsuch interventionon the
exchange rate (snja)'
Adjusttnerttwhenthe intervention outcome is notcredible.
The discUssionup to this point has focused on the one-
perio<i response toa shockto exchange rate expectations.
The total changeinthe exchange rateinthe long run will
depend on how expectations, sofar treated as exogenous,
areaffectedbyintetvention. Supposethatthe outcome of
intervention is credible, in the.sensethat speculators be-
lievethattherewilFbeno further change in the exchange
rate. Then agents will make no further effort to acquire
domestic assets. Equation(ll) then describes the total
changeinthe exchangerate that will occur in response to
the initialshocktoexchange rate expectations.
To see/how the pattern of adjustment differs when the
outcome ofintervention is notcredible, assume that spec-
ulatorsbelieve that the exchange rate must ultimately
adjustto Some target exchange tate s*, regardless ofthe
short-runattempts ofpolicymakers to prevent such adjust-
ment. We canthink ofs*as thelevelofthe exchange rate
thatwillsatisfy some long-run equilibrium condition (for
example, the value ofthe exchangeratethatwill guarantee
that{he net present··value.'of an economy's external lia-
bilities is zero). Alterriatively, we canthink of s* as the
level()fthe exchange rate thatis seen as acceptable by a
country's major trading partners or a country's creditors.
Consider noW- a shockto exchange rate expectations in
period1, causedby aone-timeincreaseins*abovethe spot
exchangetate,or(s* :"-so»O. Speculators acquire domes-
tic assetsontheexpectationthatthe gap betweenthe target
exchange rate s* and the spot rate So will be eliminated.
Economic Review / 1992, Number1When.markets.·reopen in the next period, the government
haspreventedfull adjustment in the spot rate to s* by the
proportion(l=.a.) (as in equation (11», and speculators
again acquire domestic assets on the expectation thatthe
remaining •.. gap .between. s* and the·· .•spot rate will be
eliminated. This process ofrepeated domesticassetac-
quisition and.intervention will continue in subsequent
periods, producingfurtherchanges inthe. exchangerate. In
effect,wecansaythatinterventionspreadstheinitialshock
to exchange rate expectations overseveral periods. Ineach
period, the shockto expectations is measured by the gap




tileinitialshock depends onthe rateofinterventiona and
themagnitudeoftheinitialshocktoexchangerateexpecta-'
tions. The term W- 1 impliesthatthe rate ofchangein the
exchangerate declines asymptoticallytowards zero. Inthe
absence.ofintervention(a=O),thefullimpactofthe shock
to expectationsis feltin the firstperiod;··and·according to
equation(4)theexchangeratechangesby ~Sl==sx(S*-so)'
From equation (16), the cumulative changein.theex-
changerateoverTperiodsthatis.associatedwiththeinitial
shockis:
wherelixl.isnow.the shock to exchange.rate expectations
that?ccurs in each period as a resultofthe initial increase
ins* above so'
Inequation (14), the path oflixtdependsonthepathof
St. We can solve for the path ofst by using equations (4)
and (14), which yield the· following difference equation:
where the coefficientsx is implied byeqllation(4).10
As discussed in Appendix B, t.l}e solution to equation
(15) is:
T T
(17) L Lls1=(l-a)sxL (jt-l(s* -so),
1=1 1=1·
Chartl illustrates. the path of exchange rate changes
implied.by equation (16). The area under the curve is
measllredby equation (17); The chartassumes a ·100
percent appreciation in the.target ..exchange rates;!,,and
sx==1 .. 'rhepathsofexchangeratecl1anges areillllstrated
for the cases in which the rate of appreciation in each
periodislimitedto 2.5percent(a=.0.975)andlOpercent
(a= 0.9).
Inspection of the chart and the equations suggests that
Chart
Response to Appreciation in Target.Exchange Rate
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Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 21which exceeds intervention in equation (13) by
T T
(18) wlij;Cb = -a~LLUI =-a~L {3l-1 (s * -sO>'
snfa 1=1 Snja 1=1
where the secondequality follows because, from equations
(15) and (16), Ax,= W- 1(s* - so), Over'aninfinite hori-
zon, cumulative intervention is:
the expectation that the spot exchange rate in any.given
period will tend to some targets* affects thepattem of
exchangerate adjustmentinanumber ofways.
First,·.intervention ..candistribute the impact.ofa·.one-
time shockto expectationsovertime undercertainassump-
tionsabout the adjustment ofexpectations. The reason is
that speculators seekto acquire domestic currency-· .and
create.upward pressure on> the currency-inevery period
solongastheexchange rateisbelows*. Incontrast,.when
the.outcome ofintervention.isctedible (asin equation
(11»,·the exchangerate change lasts only one period.
Second, interventioniseffective in the shortrun, butnot
.initheilongrun.In the absenceofinterventi()n.(a:=::O), the
spotexchange rate would appreciate 100 percentin one
period~andthere would be no further.changes··in•.·the
exchangerate.Incontrast, inChartI, forthe casea =0.9,
the cumulative changeintheexchangerateislimitedto 10
percent in the first period.and 65 percent after 10 periods.
While interventiondoesstabilize the exchange rate inthe
short run, in the.very .long run the spot rate converges
to S*.11
Third, thecu111ulative intervention is largerwhen the
outcome ofintervel1tionis notqredible. Equation(13}is
now the starting poinffor· a .sequence of intervention
actions, ..rather than representing ••.the total .•intervention.
Cumulative intervention overTperiods is nowgiven by:
cumulative.intervention. As can be.seen inChart 1, ifthe
rateofinterventionis very large(a= .975),thefirst-period
changein the exchange ratewill besmall,butsubsequent
exchange rate changes will decline very gradually. Ifthe
rate ofintervention.is smaller (a=0.90) the first period
change .in •.the exchange rate will be· quite large, but
subsequent exchange rate changes will drop off more
steeply. Thereadercan verify that cumulativeintervention
inequation(18').increaseswith the.rate ofinterventiona.
Instability
The preceding analysis predicts a gradually declining
rate·of change in the exchange rate. At times, however,
changes in the exchange rate ac.celefate··l"atheftharf die
down gr~d.ually. There isno easy wayofmodeling s~ch a
pt()cess. ()Ileway toproc.eed is to ~ssumethatspeculators
believe that the adjustment to the target exchange rate will
need.tobe.larger the longer the. gap betweentl:1e • spot and
the target exchange rate persists.
To motivate this last assumption, considera country
whose large trade surpluses provoke threats ofprotection-
istretaliation byits trading partners. Agentssetthetarget
exchange rate s,*, which now may vary from period to
period,ata level they thinkwill reduce trade surpluses by
enoughtoavertretaliation. Theyrevisetheirestimateofst*
upward ifthenews.this periodindicatesnoreductionin the
tradesurplus orcomplaintsbytradingpartners. OtherWise,
the target s,* remains unchanged or is lowered. We can
think of a situation where intervention prevents equi-
librium exchange rate adjustment, resulting ina sequence
of increasing trade surpluses. This in turn prompts a
sequenceofupwardrevisions inst*thatareassociatedwith
~ccelerating. appreciation .• over .several •periods.. In •this
manner,theinteraction between interventionandexpecta-
tions may·be destabilizing. 12
To illustrate this argumentin. a simple way,.assUme that
the target or equilibrium exchangerate grows at the con-
stantrate (1+<1» when the exchange rate is below target,
where <1»0. Suppose also thatinperiod lthere is a shock
that raises the targetexchange rate by a factor (1- <1», so
that(S1* = (1+<I»so*)' Then, so long as the positive gap
between the target and actualexchange rate remains, in
subsequent periods,
a(s • -sO>
(1 - a)srifa '
lim w~.. IiCb=-asx(s• -so> .lirnl··~.. {31.i.·•.J.





Fourth, the rate ofintervention influences thepatternof
exchange rate adjustment over time, as well as the total
Bysuitablymodifying equation(14), wehavethefollowing
sequence ofshocks to expectations:
22 Economic Review / 1992, Number 1Bymodifyirigequation (15), we·find thatthe change in the
c;:x6hilllge rate in each period is now governed by
Tlie solution to this difference.equation, derivedin Appen-
dixB, implies,that:
(22).1s,=(1-0l)Sx(So· (1 +if»IZI-fjl-ISO)'
wher~Zt ,is·defined in AppendixB. .In equation (22), the
Rath()ftheexchangerate is unstable, andtherate,ofchange
inthe exchange rate increases overtime. ThIs instabilityis
associated with the shocks to exchange rate expectations,
w6ic6areincreasil1g.in each period. Equating,aSt in
equations (21) (first equality) and(22), we canexpress the
shocks toe)(pectations intermsofthe startingvalues ()fthe
target and spot rates:
Cumulative changes in the exchange rate and cumulative




where we use equation (23) to obtain equations (24) and
(25).
Intheprecedingwehave.assumedthat speculators ac~as
if<f> isfixed,sothats/ increasesJorever. This assumption
allows us to solve a difference equation. In reality,how-
ever, the value of<f> and the contillued accumulation of
positive changes to the exchange rate.in equation (24) will
dependon news abouttheexternal balanceorthereactions
oftrading partners orother pertinent events. Once agents
receive the news that trade surpluses have fallen· Or that
trading partners are satisfied with the currentlevel ofthe
exchange rate, exchange rate appreciation will·cease,and
may even,sharplyreverse.direetion ifs* falls below St.
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Effects on Velocity andAssetPrices
In the unstable.case just described, the target r~te is
growing each period, producingincreasesin theexpeeted
rateofappreciation in'eachperiod.According'to equations
(4)to (6), these period..to-period changes inexchange rate
expectations·will affect the price level and domestic inter-
est rates as well as, the exchange rate. FUrthermore, the
government's intervention ruleimpliesthatthese shocks to
expectationswillbeassociatedwithincreasesinthe money
supply and matching increases ,.in the ..netforeign, asset
holdings ofthecentralballk..To determine the combined
effects ofshockstoexchangerate.expectations anclmoney





wh.ere,fromequation(5), Px<0;Pnfa = Pm - Pf>O. Apply-
ing (23) and(25) to(26) we obtain:
7'.. .!.OlSP .] .. 1'
(26'). L. I#J,=p.,-' '" .L(so' (I +~)'Z,-P'-'s,,)~1J
,'=1 , sn/a 1=1
Equation,(26) shows.that.the inflationary·effects ofthe
seguenceofincreasesinthe money supply duetointerven-
tion(PnR}IlI~=laf/b>O) are, offset.by .the.deflationary
effectsofthesequenceofpositive shocks to exchange rate
expectations(pxI~=rAxt<O). Asa result,' less than pro..
p()rtional'· increas~s in·the price level· maybe. associated
with money growth. Given a constantleveFofreal'GNP,
this may resultinpersistentdeclines in velocitY (the ratio
ofnominal GNPto money).
Equation(26') shows howthe path of t4e, price level
depends·on the underlying behavioral and intervention
parameters. Itis apparent from (26') that velocitymay de-
clineatan accelerating rate influencedbythemagnitudeof
<f>.Also, the deflationaryeffects ofshockstoexchangerate
exp~tationswilltend tobe larger,the largeristhe,impact
ofexpectationsontqepricelevel(Px)' Ifthese deflationary
effects.aresllfficiently large, the•money growth.resulting
from int~rventioncould •• be associated with·a declining
rather,thanincreasing price level. Thus, an increase in the
money supply resulting from intervention will be associ-
ated .with·· a less ·than proportional increase in. inflation
(andpossibly deflation) andwithpersistentandaccelerat-
ingdeclines in velocity.
23To determine the impact ofshocks to exchange rate
expectations and associated intervention on asset prices,
we use equations (6), (23), and (25) to obtain:
(27)
the.money supply.associated with intervention is Ilm/=
(1-"1)wllt;eb.. IUs apparent thatthechange inthe money
supply associated with intervention falls as the rate of
sterili1;atioIl'yrises. Nevertheless, there is a limit to how
much. policymakers can sterilize. One difficulty· is that
sterilization may be incompatit>lewith the government's
exchange rate policy, as it reduces theimpactofinterven-
tion on. the eJl.change rate. With sterilization, the change
intheexchange rate associated with government interven-.
tionis:
Reducing the Exposure to External Shocks
The government may attempt to reduce the eco~omy's
exposure to external shocks in three ways. First, the
monetary effects .of exchange. rate intervention .may be
offsetbyadjustingdomestic credit. SuchapolicyiskIl.own
as "sterilizedintervention," and can be described by the
rule:
where, from equation (6), ix<O;.im<O;~<O, and we as"
sumethatitifa=im-it<O. Equation (27) saysthatboth the
sequence.of.increases.in .•expected appreciation and the
expansion in.netforeign assets and.moneywill contribute
to persistent and accelerating declines in the domestic
interestrate, or, equivalently, to persistentand accelerating
increases in the domestic bond price. As noted in ·our
earlierdiscussion oftheimplications ofinstitution.al char-
acteristics, the magnitude of the changes inthe domestic
interest rate (or domestic asset price) will be larger ifthe
domestic bond is a poor substitute for Qomestic money or
the foreign asset (in such a case the results in Appendix A
imply that ix and itifa will tendto rise in absolute value).
To sum up, the preceding discussion illustrates how the
credibility ofintervention policy may affectthe pattern of
exchange rate adjustment. When the outcom~ ofinterven-
tion is credible,.anydegree ofeJl.change rate stability can
be achieved at.the costof a. sufficientlylarge, (lne-time
change inthe money supply. When the •.outcome of inter-
Yyntion is not c:redible, however,.intervention can lead to
persistent and possibly accelerating changes in e~change
rates, the m(mey supply, velocity, and asset prices. .T1nder
certain conditions, .intervention may even amplify.the
cumulative change in the exchange rateratherthan reduce
it. The increased exposure to external shocks thatmay be
associated with unsterilized intervention is typically of
great concern topolicymakers.
wher~ f~fa-;Snf a<Oandtl1e gap betweenthe twoexpres-
siRnsi~creases'Yiththerate.of sterilization"I. Theeffectof
sterilizedinterventionon the exchange ratefalls as therate
ofsterilization"I'rises. Ifsterilization is complete ("I = 1),
sothattherdsno changeinthe money supply, theimpactof
intervention on the· exchange. rate is entirely the result
Rfthe exchange of foreig~fordomestic bonds, as reflected
inthe t~11Il-sj»lli/b..secause.sfdeclines as,thedegreeof
substitutabilityincreases,theimpactofsterilizedinterven-
tion also declines. Intuitively, sterilized intef\Tentionpro-
vides the speculatorwith a domestic bondrather than with
" ", '0
0
•••••• har" n,...:.&::r. .fn..... ·f.ha.f..,......:o.;...,...." nC'lS"'~ The ...,.._......0+.....,... ............
moneyl11e~cJ.,,<,15'" ~\.u U.l"" J.V.l,",.l5Ha~ "'I.. .111 e,l~al.~l lll~
sUbstitutability ofthe domestic bond for the foreign asset
relinquished by the speculator, the smaller the impact on
the exchange rate.
Aside • from being potentially less effective, sterilized
intervention may require the government to issue debt
instruments in order to bring about sufficiently large
adjustments in domestic credit, ifcentral bankholdings of
marketable securities are insufficient. In the absence of
changes in fiscalpolicy,theintertemporal government
budget constraint implies that government debt instru-
ments issuedtodaymustberedeemedby printingmoney at
sometime in the futlue. Thus sterilization may reduce the
changeinthemoney supplytoday at the cost of a larger
change inthe money supplyin theJuture.
Second,thegoyernment.can.impose capital·controls.
Suchcontrols tendtpinsulatetheeconomyfromtheimpact
~f.·exchange rate expectations. by .•making.it difficult for
speculatorstotransactinforeignexchange markets..Capi-
talcontrols reducesx' Px' ix in equations (24), (25), (26'),
and (27). Inspectionoftheseequations shows thatoverany
finite· horizon,cumulative ••changes in the.exchange rate,
intervention, and any related disturbances to the domestic
price level and the domestic interest rate associated with a
where "I is the degree of sterilization. The central bank shocktoexchangerateexpectationsdeclineas thesecoeffi-
.balancesheet equation(7)thenimplies thatthe changein .... -~cients-decline;-Ifthecontrols-are soextensive that they are
24 Economic Review / 1992, Number1interpretedas amajorregime shift, they may alsodrivethe
targetexchange rates,* below the spot rate and cause a
reversal in the path of the exchange rate. While this
possibility is not explicitly modeled here, it was probably
importantin Taiwan's. case.
Third;the.government can reduce.therate ofinterven"
tion, thus allowing the exchangerate to float morefreelyin
eachperiod:.As suggested-by our discussion of Chartl,
reducing the tate ·.of intervention tends to reduce the
persistenceofchanges intheexchangerateattributableto a
one-time shocktoexchange rate expectations.
1l1.···TAIWAN's EXPERIENCE
To.analyzeTaiwan's experienceinthe 1980s, we exam-
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Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco 25that may have influenced exchange rate behavior. For this
purpose, Chart 2 shows the nominal US$/NT$ exchange
rate, the real trade-weighted'NT dollar, .and· the current
account in the 1980s. We also examine the pattern of
intervention of the central bank by reviewing changes in
foreign exchange reserves by the central bank, and its two
rnajordeterminants-short-term capital flows ••• and the
current account, illl1stratedin.Chart3.13
InChart'3, changes inthe foreign exchange reservesof
the central bank are a proxy for intervention. To ascertain
thesuitabilityofthisproxy, weneedtodo twothings. First,
we need to determine the extentto which changes in
reserves resultfrom shocks toexchangerateexpe~tations,
asonly suchchanges canbesaidto correspondtointerven.:.
tion inforeign exchange markets. To dealwith thisques~
tion, we note that when there are positive shocks to
exchange rate expectations speculators attempt to acquire
domestic assets, andthecentralbankintervenestodampen
theresulting upward pressure on the exchange rate. These
actions will simultaneously be reflected in the balanceof
payfuents accounts as an increase in short-term capital
inflows and in the foreign exchange reserves held by the
central bank. The converse holds when there are negative
shocks to expectations. Thus, ahigh correlation between
short-term capital flows and changes in foreign exchange
reserves indicates whether such changes largely reflect
intervention.
Second, we need to assess thelikelyeffects,of systema~
tic changesin foreign exchange reserve holdings that are
unrelated to intervention. Inthe case ofTaiwan, the main
sourceofsuch systematic changes was the requirement, in
effectuntilJuly 1987, thatexporters surrendertheirforeign
exchange earnings (see SectionI). The path ofthe current
accountbalancethus provides an indicatoroftheinfluence
ofthe trade sector on foreign exchange res,erves.
As illustrated in Chart 3, changes inreserves are highly
correlated with short-term capital flows, in spite of. a
widening gap between the level of changes in foreign
exchange reserves and short-term capital flows in the
course of the 1980s. This widening gap is attributable to
the rising current account surpluses that are also shown in
the chart. Thus, changes in foreign exchange reserves
appear to be a reasonably good proxy for intervention in
Taiwan in the 1980s.
Patterns in the Exchange Rate, Capital Flows,
andIntervention
InspectionofCharts2 and 3 suggeststhatthe1980smay
be divided into three periods. In the first period, 1980:1.:.
1985:3, there was a downward trendin the US$/Nr$
exchange rate up to 1982, followed by a periodofstability.
,
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Irithis period, the exchange rate againstthe US. dollaron
average depreciated ata. compound· annual rate, of just
under 2 percent, in spite of growing current account
sUrpluses. The real trade-weighted exchange rate also
exhi9ited ,a. slight· downward trend. Short-term .. capital
flows andthe associatedintervention wererelatively slllall
(capital outflowS averaged $128 million per quarter),and
showed no systematic trend. The relative tranquility in
foreign exchange ,markets. suggests.that speculators did
notdoubtthe government's abilityto limit movements.in
theNTdollm;overthis period. Interms ofthe modeldevel-
oped in Section II, it appears th~t adjustments in the
~x.cba.ng~rliteinresponse to shockscouldbedescribed by
equation(11).
Doubts aboutthegov~rnment'sabilitytopreventtheNT
dollar from appreciatingagainstthe US. dollar appear to
have arisenin the mid-1980s. One reason is that the NT
dollar's relative stability against a falling US. dollarin
198? was •. associated with· a. shlifP real trade-weighted
depreciation that was incompatible with Taiwan's growing
extemalsurpluses (Ctiart 2).Inthis context, the statement
-by theG-5industrial countries, following their SepteIDber
.1985Plaza,meeting,thatthe US. dollar shoulddepreciate
further apparently created expectations that the Taiwan
governmentwouldhavetoallowthe NT dollar to appreci-
ate against the U.S. dollar. This perception wasreinforced
in;thecQurse ofthe',second'halfof the 1980s, ,as Taiwan's
trading partners, notably the US., openly expressed con-
cernabol1tTaiwan's trade surplus and government ex-
changerate policy.
Thesedevelopmentsprovidethe contextfor the behavior
oftheexchangerateandshort-termcapitalflows inthesec-
ondperiod, 1985:4toaboutl987:4. Inthis period,therate
ofa~preciationin the NT dollar accelerated every quarter
fornearlytwoyears, from a compound annual rate of2.2
percentin 1985:4toapeakofnearly 31 percent in 1987:3.
Qn, average, the NT dollar appreciated againstthe US.
dollar at a compound annual rate of 14 percent in
1985:4-1987:4, comparedtoanaveragedepreciationof1.8
percent in the first period. There was a concomitant
increase in short-term capital inflows, which averaged
nearly U$$2.4 billiOIlper quarter, compared to average
outflows ofUS$128 million.inthe first period. Largely as a
result of stepped-up intervention, the acclJmwation. of
foreign exchange reserves rose to.an average of U$$6.5
billion aquarter,froman averageofunder $1 billion in the
firstperiod. By comparison to other economies, or to
'Taiwan's ownbist()rical experience, the amount of inter-
vention was unprecedented. Taiwan's foreign exchange
res~rvesrosetoa peakofUS$77billionin1987, thirdafter
.Japan and,Germany in ·that year. (In domestic· currency
terms, foreign assets held by the CentralBarik ofChina
ECODomicReview / 1992, Number 1Effects onfheDomesticMoneySupply,
Velocity, andAssetPrices
Table 3
Growth in money and velocity






































The effects of intervention on the money supply were
influenced by the government's sterilization policy. To
describe this policy, we examine the patterns ofchanges in
net foreign assets and in domestic credit (the two compo-
nents of the monetary base in equation (7)), reported in
Table 2. The table suggests thatinthe first two perioo;, net
( fpreign asset.expansion was associated with large reduc-
tions indomestic credit. The contractionindomestic credit
was largely accomplished through the issuance ofinterest-
bearing short-termcentralbankcertificates ofdeposits and
savings bonds, as the supply of Treasury securities is
limited by Taiwan's conservative fiscal policy. Tabl~ 2,also
shows that domestic credit expanded very strongly in the'
third period. This appears to have been related to earlier
sterilization policy, as the Central Bank created money to
redeem its maturing short-termliabilities in that period)6
In spite ofthe high rate of sterilization, Table 3 shQ~s
that the rate of base money growth accelerated from an
average annual rate of 16 percent in the period 1980:1-
1985:3 to 35 percent after 1988. The acceleration in money
(CBC)increasedfrom NT$504billionin 1983, to a.peakof
Nf$2;26trillion in1987, about 30tiinesitsIevelten years
earlier.)
The.discussion in Section II'.suggests that the.apparent
instability ofthe NT dollar and ofcapitalinflows overthis
periodmay have beenpartlythe resultpfgovernmentinter-
vention inforeign• exchangemarkets,' in.asituation where
the exchange rate outcome of·such intervention.was not
crediblebecallseof rising current accountsur.plusesand
~xpressionsofconcern byTaiwan's majottradingpartners.
Inparticlllar, the behavior,of thee"change rate oyerthis
period appears.to be roughly consistentwith•theunstable
casedes(:ribed;,.byeqllation.(24),.while.·thesharp.••ac(:elera-
tipnillinterVentionappears to conformto equation(25).14
The'.governmentsought'to limit;'the··jmpactofshocks
from the, external sectorin a number ofways (see discus,.
sioninSectionI).First,!t s~ughtto curbshort-termcapital
inflowsbyfreezing.the external liabilities of the banking
sectorat.the,end ofMay 1987 andthen againin October
1987~Second, •it·attt::mpted to reduce the link between
ctirrentaccountsurpluses and changesinforeignexchange
reserves by lifting all restrictions on current account trans,.
actionsirtJult1987, including the requirementthatforeigl1
currency expOrt revenues be exchanged for domestic cur-
rency. Third~"it shifted to floating exchange rates in April
1989~ .
Thesepolicymeasureswerefollowed bymaikedchanges
inthe. patt~TI1~of external distur~ances(llld their impact on
foreign exchange reserves, which characterized the third
period" 1988-1989. Restrictions, on, capital,·inflowS •pre-
vented speculators,from freely acquiring'Nfdollar assets,
contributing to a slowdow?.inthe rate of appreciation.'of
the. NTdollar to '8.3" percent,(the NT dollar actually fell
sharplY lateintheperiod, adeclinethatcontinuedin1990).
Tbere was .also a reversal in short-term,capital inflows to'
averag~putflowsofU$$1.2billion per q\larter,15 Thus, in
the later partof the 1980s, short-term capital flows had a
conthictionary irtflllenceon foreign exchange reserVes and
on thedomestic monetary base.
The liberalization ofcurrent account transactions and
the shift to floating had strong effectsoothe accumulation
offoreign exchange reserves of the central bank. As is
apparent.in Chart 3,/the gap between changes in foreign
exchange reserves andshort-termcapital flows'was largely
eliminat~q.after 1987, whenthe requirementthatexporters
SUrrendertheirforeign exchange reserves was suspended.
Changes in foreign' exchange' reserves diverged sharPly
fromshort-termcapital flows after the shifttofloating in
the .second half of 1989, suggesting that the government
had stopped intervening. .
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Changesir'linterest rates
(annual ratesin·percent)
tions. Asishown in Table 4, Taiwan's domestic money
marketrate fellin comparison to foreign short-term rates
(the3-monthellf
odollarrate) as the. 1980s progressed,but
the relative decline in domestic interest rates was·quite
limited. The reason is that Taiwan's domestic money
marketinteracted quite extensively with intemationalfi-
nancial markets.
··.tn stafk<ionirast~ the pricesofassets that were·not so
cl()sely linked byarbitrage to.extemalmarkets increased






price.wereseveralorders of magnitudelargerthan stock
priceincreases inJapan andthe U.S.,.which also experi-
encedstockmarketbooms.inthe.second·halfofthe••1980s.
Taiwan'![sto:kpriceindexrosefrom 162 attheendof1986
to1557bythe endof1989, raising pricelearnings ratiosof
listedcotnpanies toover55 bythe endof1989 (compared












growth initiallyreflected the direct expansionaryeffects of
intervention policy. However, base money gr()wthcon-
tinuedto accelerate even after.the reversal of capital
inflowsin 1988.Onereasonisthatthe government shifted
to floatipg exchange rates in April1989,which limited the
contractionary influence ofcapitaloutflows onthe mone-
tarybase. .
•Another ..reason. for the. ·acceleration.iin ..• base··Jl19Iley
gro\Vthinthe.laterpartofthe 1980sisthatthe rede~pti911
9fs~ort-termCBCpaperhad astrongexpansio~ary imp~ct
ol!d?~estic credit. Thus, effo~ts toliIIlitmolletarygrowth




t~anthe rate ofgrowthill themonetary base.In the third
pe~od,however,MlgroWthslowe?toabottthalfthe. rat~of
gr()'Xt~in tne monetary base. ()ne possibl~expla.nati?nis
thattheeffortsby speculators t()exchangetheirNTd()llar
deposits for foreignassets offsetthe expansionary impact
ofthe rapid growth in the monetary base.
The acceletati?nin money growth did.not result in
cO:r;respondingly large increases in inflation. In fact, infla-
tiondeclined(froma compoundannual rateof6percentin
the first period to 2.3 Percent in the second period) as
moneygrowth accelerated,suggestingthatincreasesinthe
demand for Ml exceeded the growth in tt~e money supply.
Speculators were•apparently .llotint~~estedin.purchasing
g()ods with the .!'rT.dollars ..thtY a.cquir~? in the foreigll
exchange.market, but held them on the expectation of
earning large gains·frotn·currency appreciation. In line
withthis, Ml velocit~declinedata20petCentannuiu rate
in thep~riodlQ8~:4-1Q87:4,c()lJlparedt02 percent in the
firstperiod; Inflation pickedupand the decline in velocity
slowed sharply in the last two years of the 1980s,as the
curbs on capital inflows took effectand the speculative
demandforNTdollarassets ceased. Thesharpfiuctuations
in velocity are consistent with the predictionsofthe model
discussed earlier.18 .
EffectsonAssetPrices
While the expansion of liquidity did not result in an
increaseininflatiollinthe short run, ourearlierdisqussion
suggests that it shouldhave resulted in an increase in asset
pricesor(equiyalently) declilles in interestrates..Further-
more, the effects onasset prices should have been smaller
inthose domestic assetmarketsthataremore tightlylinked
by arbitrage to foreign asset markets, or·where.domestic
assets are closer substitutes for foreign assets. The results
ofTables 4 and 5 are toughly in line with these expecta-
TableS
~h~ngesinstock • prices
(compound annual rates in percent)
Thiwan Japan u.s.
80:1~85:3 2 15 10
85:4-87:4 81 29 7
88:1-89:4 72 16 14
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In this paper we have attempted to explain certain
puzzlingfeatures ofthe behaviorofexchangerates, money
velocity, andassetprices inTaiwaninthe1980sbysuggest-
ing a different way· oflooking at the interaction.between
exchange market intervention and exchange rateexpecta-
tions..Using a simple theoretical framework, we have
discussed how the credibility ofintervention policy may
affect the. pattern of adjustment in the exchange rate,
velocity, and asset prices. When the outcomeofinterven-
tionis.·credible,.any•degree ofexchangerate stability can
be achieved at the cost of.a suffici~ntlylarge, one~time
change in the money supply. When the outcome of inter-
v~ntion is notcredible,.however, .intervention can lead to
persistent, andpossibly accelerating, changes inexchange
rates, the money supply, velocity, and assetprices. Under
certain conditions, inte~ention may even amplify the
cUffiulativechange intheexchange rateratherthanreduce
it.A-Ii infotmal examination ofthe datasuggests thatthe
model developedin the paper canbe used as a framework
for explaining Taiwan's experience.
Two implications ·of Taiwan's experience are worth
highlighting. First,disturbances to foreign exchange and
domestic assetmarkets in a developing economy need not
arise from unsustainable fiscal and monetary policies and
macroeconomic instability. Foreign exchange rate inter-
vention may be associated with large disturbances to asset
markets evenWin astable and 'well-managed economy.
Second, there is a little recognized potential tradeoff
between the.d~sire to protect tradable goodsproduction by
limiting exchange rate movements and the desire to stabil-
ize in foreign exchange and domestic asset markets. In
economies with a high degree of capitli mobility, and
where intervention policy is not credible, efforts to protect
the tradable goods sector through such intervention may
contribute to instability in asset markets. This effect may
be more pronounced when domestic andforeign assets are
not good substitutes.
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ENDNOT-ES
1. Theupward pressure on the NTdollarappears to have beenrelated to
Taiwan's current account surpluses, whichon an anriual basis averaged
close to 14percentofGNPbetween 1983 and 1988, and reached a peak
(on an annual basis) ofover20percent in 1986. These surpluses appear
to be the largest ever recorded in the world. By comparison, at their
respective peaks in the 1980s, current account surpluses reached 1.1 to
1.2 percent ofGNP in Japan and Germany, and 7.7 percent in Korea.
2. A similarpattern ofrapid money growth, low inflation and declining
velocity, and asset price inflation was obserVed in Japan iri the~second
halfofthe 1980s.
3. For more details on the institutional characteristics of Taiwan's
financial sector see Cheng (1986), Kuo (1989), Liang (1988), Shea
(1990), Yang (1990), and Wang and Kim (1990).
4. In particular, the interest-setting arrangements prevailing in Taiwan
in the 1980s·apparently introduced a certain amount'of rigidity· in .
deposit rates. Yang (1990) notes that the variation in bank rates in
Taiwan tends to be smaller than the variation in market rates. She also
refers to a study she has carried out using vector ARIMA techniques
which finds that the bankrate in the 1980s adjusted abouta month after
the freely-determined money-market rate. (The latter rate is the rate set
in the short-terni bills exchange market established in 1976.) Some
interest rate policies were also designed 'to subsidize credit to certain
priority sectors, specifically the export sectorup to the 1980s, and later
the high-tech sector.
5; Strictly speaking, equation (3) also applies ex post to the national
income accounting identity in levels rather than in logs. The present
approach can beseen as an approximationthat simplifies the exposition
without changing the qualitative results.
6. For a full description of this type of model, see Branson and
Henderson (1985).
7: One way to thirik aboutthis is to argue thatlackofdomestic financial
market development raises the transacti~ns cost associated with invest-
ing\in domestic marketable securities. Under these conditions, the
influence of the external sector in affecting domestic interest rate
deterniination is reduced. For a demonstration of these effects, see
Niehans (1991)~ A similar argument appearsto underlie the specifica-
tion adopted by Edwards and Khan (1985).
8. Theassumptionthatthe weight w is constantis an approximation that
has noeffeCt on thequalitativeresultsofthe model. Suchanapproxima-
tion would not be needed ifthe variables were expressed in levels rather
than in logs. For a similar1log-linear approximation ofthe central bank
balance sheet, see Flood and Hodrick (1985).
9. To derive (12), note that the effect ofunsterilized intervention on the
exchange rate is given by sml1mt - sfl1J] = (sm - sf)l1m~=I1sf, where
we use Il1m]1 =Il1ftl. Applying equation (10), we have I1sf= -al1x],
which yields equation (12).
10. The agents in the model use information about the target exchange
rate in forming theirexpectations. This is part ofthe information set we
would expect rational agents to use. A fully developed rational expec-
tations model would require us to assume that (i) exchange rate
expectations depend on the rate ofintervention and on the structure of
the economy and (ii) the government takes into account how interven-
tion affects expectations when formulating exchange rate policy. The
equilibrium under these conditions is more difficult to derive and is a
topic for future research.
291L The long"run ineffectiveness ofintervention can also be seen in the
moregenetal case ofequation (17). Note that
lim';" lim T _
T....oo D as,=(l-a)$q-+ooE P' I(S * -sO> =(s· -so>
,-I . ..... ,-I
where.we use. lim f p'_I =__ 1_= 1__ ..
T-+oo 1=1 I -p s.(1-a)
12. An .altemative way of modeling instability in the path of the
exchange rate is to use a monetary<approach to the exchange ratewith
rational expectations and pickthe unstable solution of the difference
equation for the ex~hange rate. Thedisadvantageofthis approachisthat
no intuition is offered for the underlying process that generates the
explosion. Certain arguments have also been offered to rule out such
explosive processes. Still another approach istoanalyze what happens
when an expected change in monetary policyis notrealized over the
SamPle period (the "peso problem"). Obstfeld (1989) shows that such a
situation canlead to an exchange rate process that is indistinguishable
from an explosive speculative bubble. In Obstfeld's framework, per-
sistent appreciation may arise ifspeculators expectthat the government
will have to reverse its monetary policy (or its unsterilized intervention
inexchange markets, inthe case consideredinthe text) at some time in
the Juture. In the·text we suggest the· alternative possibility that
interventionitself may contribute to the apparent instability.
13. Theun,derlying data used in Charts 2 and 3 and the Tables in this
section were obtained from various issues ofthe CentralBankofChina's
, Financial Statistics, Taiwan District or the International Monetary
Fund's International Financial Statistics. The real trlide-weighted NT
dollar illustrated in Chart2 was constructed by taking the geometric
weighted llverageofthe exchange value ofthe NT dollarwithrespect to
the currencies ofeightofits tiading partners, including the U.S. dollar,
the yen, and the deutschemark. The weights were based on Taiwan's
total bilateral trade with these trading partners in 1980..
14. An alternative explanation is that a sequence ofshocks to exchange
rate expectations in 1985-1987 (absent in 1980-85) that resulted in
persistentandacceleratingappreciation. ijowever, itisnotobviouswhat
these shocks could be. As we shall see,onthe domestic side, money
growth accelerated in the second period, so that the persistent.and
accelerating appreciation in the NT dollllFcannot be explained by
progressively tighter monetary policy. There w~re no dramatic changes
in Taiwan's fiscal policy that could explain real appreciation either. On
the external side, current account surpluses had been increasing since
the early 1980s, so in this respectthe period 1985-87 was not very
different from 1980-85. The main shocks that may have affected
exchange rate expectations differently in 1985-87 were the real trade-
weighted depreciation of the NT dollar in 1985, which predates the
persistentappreciation ofthe NT$ against the U.S. dollar, and the one-
time decline in oil prices late in 1986. As these were one-time shocks,
something else mustexplain why the appreciationpersisted and acceler-
ated in 1985-87. Wesuggestthat the effects ofintervention on expecta-
tions played an important role.
15. The effects ofthe freeze in external liabilities were already apparent
in 1987. As can be seen in Chart 3, short"term capital flows dropfrom a
peak ofaround $ 3.7 billion to nearly zero between the first and third
quarters ofl987, with aconcomitantdip in the accumulation offoreign
exchange reserves by the central bank. There was an even larger drop
between the fourth quarter ofl987and the first quarter of1988.
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16. Sterilization policies produced sharp fluctuations in the amount of
interest-bearing liabilities ofthe CBC. The outstanding value ofthese
liabilitiesincreasedfrom NT$14billion in1983 to apeakofnearlyNT$
1.2trillion in 1987. They subsequently fell to NT$ 415 billionat the end
of 1989, as the CBC retired short-term liabilities as they came due.
17.Thispointis madein Yin(1990). The episodecanbethoughtofas an
illustration ofSargent and Wallace's unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,
where-absent changes in fiscal policy-the issuance of government
bonds toreduce money growth today leads to more rapid money growth
in the future; For a discussion of unpleasant monetari~t arithmetic see
Sargent (l987b).
18. In contrast to the sharp fluctuations in narrow money aggregates,
there was no acceleration in M2 growth between the first and second
periods. Itappears that speculators acquiring NT dollar assets preferred
to hold readily convertible orliquid assets, likeMl, rather than the less
liquid components ofM2. This appears to have offset significantly any
tendency fot thedeiriand foiM2 to rise as ares\dtoftheoverallincrease
in the demandfor NT dollar assets. In line with this view, there was a
smaller (rather than larger) rate ofdecline in M2 velocity as the decade
progressed.
19. Other. factors .also appear to have contributed to the very steep
increases, in Taiwan's stock prices. FIrst, stock prices may have been
undervalued, as the rate'ofincrease in stockprices inTaiwan up to 1985'
was low givenTaiwan's exceptionaleconomicperformance. Second, the
expansion in liquidity in the mid-1980s appears to have triggered a
speculative bubble in Taiwan's stockmarkets that lasteduntil the endof
the ,decade (the existence of a bubble is suggested by the fact that
Taiwan's stock market subsequently lost as much as 80 percent of its
value in 1990).
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RESPONSES TO SHOCKS INA STATIC, SMALL OPEN
ECONOMY MODEL
Differencing the system (1)to(3)yields:
ThesignofequationA4is actually ambiguous, becausethe
decline inthe demand for the foreign assettends to lower
thedomestic inter~strate, whiletht~concortlitantincrease
in the demand for money tends to raise the domestic inter-
est I"ate. The intuitively plausible ca~e i~<0 is selected
here. .
Al "[' -1 -1
{a+oJ
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wherethe structural coefficients are discussedin thetext.
The iilverseofthe matrlx.onthe left~handside'is:'
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SUmmingequationsA5, A8, andAllyieldsequation(4) in
the text. Summing A3, A6, anq A9 yields equation (5),
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THE P4TH OFTlfESpOTEXCHANGERATE UNDER
ALTERNATIVEEXPECTATIONS ASSUMPTIONS
To illustrate how the solutions to difference equations·iri
the text are derived, consider the mostgeneralcase:
Special cases
Case 1: s/=s*






In the verylongTun, we have
where •the •.second equality follows·. because (1-- ~) =





W-~(l __O!)sx(s • -so>.
B6
B5
The.firstequalityinequatiOnBLsays.that the change in
the exchange rate in this. period depends.on the rate.of
interventiona, the reducedforrnresp?nse. ofthe exchange
rate to a •shock toexchangeTat~.expectationssx (from
equatipn(4)inthetext), andthe magnitude oftheshOC1cto
exchange rate expectations this. period .:Ut. The second
equality shows thatthe shock toexchangerat~expectations
depends on thegap between thetargetexchange rate this
periods/and last period's exchange rate S,-I.
RewritingBl yields
Recursive substitution into B1' yields the following solu-
tion (alternatively, see Sargent (1987a.) Chapter9):
I-I
B2 sl=~lso+(l-a)sxL(hl : i ,
i=O
It follo\vs from equation,B6 that ,as t~oo, ,,~t - lan.d~st
asymptotically approach zero. Equation (B6)corresppnds
to equation (16) inthe text.
where So isth~initial value of th~ spotexchange rate. The
changeinthe spot rate in eachperiodis given by: Case 2: Sl· =s··; ·s,,=l
B3
Fromthe definitionof ~ given earlier; this caseimplies that
~ = a. EquationB6 thenbecotnes
This is the. case plotted. ill Chart 1.
where in the second equality we use (1-~) = sx(l-a).
32 EconomiccReview I 1992,.NUlDber1Given an initialtarget exchange rate so*,the target ex-
change rate in eachperi()dis givellhy:





Itis apparent from equation'B8 that St now grows without
bound. Intervention cannot prevent this. It can also be
shown that the rate of change in the exchange rate will
accelerate indefinitely. To see this, note that the change in
the spot exchange rate is now:
BIO As= I
1~2[ ]i To simplify notation, define Zt=1-(l-{J)E' ~ '. ;
(1 +</» i=O (1 +</»
t=2,3,..., where Zt=1when t=1and
lim </> Z -~ -
t~oo I (l-a)sx +</>
Rewriting BIO,
Equation BIO', which is equation (22) in the text, shows
that the appreciation in the exchange rate now accelerates.
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